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Abstract
Since the emergence of influenza A/H1N1 pandemic virus in March–April 2009, very stringent interventions including
Fengxiao were implemented to prevent importation of infected cases and decelerate the disease spread in mainland China.
The extent to which these measures have been effective remains elusive. We sought to investigate the effectiveness of
Fengxiao that may inform policy decisions on improving community-based interventions for management of on-going
outbreaks in China, in particular during the Spring Festival in mid-February 2010 when nationwide traveling will be
substantially increased. We obtained data on initial laboratory-confirmed cases of H1N1 in the province of Shaanxi and used
Markov-chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) simulations to estimate the reproduction number. Given the estimates for the exposed
and infectious periods of the novel H1N1 virus, we estimated a mean reproduction number of 1.68 (95% CI 1.45–1.92) and
other A/H1N1 epidemiological parameters. Our results based on a spatially stratified population dynamical model show that
the early implementation of Fengxiao can delay the epidemic peak significantly and prevent the disease spread to the
general population but may also, if not implemented appropriately, cause more severe outbreak within universities/
colleges, while late implementation of Fengxiao can achieve nothing more than no implementation. Strengthening local
control strategies (quarantine and hygiene precaution) is much more effective in mitigating outbreaks and inhibiting the
successive waves than implementing Fengxiao. Either strong mobility or high transport-related transmission rate during the
Spring Festival holiday will not reverse the ongoing outbreak, but both will result in a large new wave. The findings suggest
that Fengxiao and travel precautions should not be relaxed unless strict measures of quarantine, isolation, and hygiene
precaution practices are put in place. Integration and prompt implementation of these interventions can significantly
reduce the overall attack rate of pandemic outbreaks.
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Introduction
The 2009 influenza A/H1N1 pandemic outbreaks have exhibited
some unique patterns in mainland China [1,2]. The majority of
reported H1N1 cases were initially diagnosed in coastal areas and
urban structures such as Shanghai and Beijing, where case
importation are most probable. In an attempt to contain the
community-wide spread the disease, a series of stringent non-
pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) were rapidly implemented by
the central government, including intensive contact tracing followed
by quarantine of individuals suspected of being exposed to the
disease, isolation of ill individuals with symptoms, and school closure.
Fengxiao, a tightly monitored measure of movement restriction [3,4],
was also put in place to proscribe college and university students,
faculty, and staff members to leave their campuses, and to disallow
on-campus visits while maintaining essential services and normal
scientific activities (File S1).
Although these NPIs may have contributed to reducing disease
incidence, their effectiveness from the standpoint of public health
policy remains undetermined. Various surveillance data suggest a
significant increase in the number of H1N1 cases following the
week-long October National Day holiday starting on October 1st
(Figure 1), and it is therefore natural to expect a similar trend
during the Spring Festival in mid-February of 2010, when massive
traveling is expected for a large segment of the population.
Whether the increased mobility during this holiday contributed to
the increase of disease cases is unclear, but the Chinese Center for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has already recommended
reduction of traveling during the Spring Festival. Should the
current declining trend be reversed by the massive travel during
the Spring Festival, the issue whether Fengxiao, or its variation, shall
be useful for the semester after the Spring Festival must be
addressed urgently and falls within the scope of this study. The
epidemic curve in Figure 1 displays bimodality with a turning
point around October 1st of 2009. Unlike the two epidemic waves
(spring and fall waves) reported in many areas of the world, there
was no significant weather change around the above turning point
and the schools and universities/colleges already started a month
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population with the beginning of the fall semester in late August
and this reseeding certainly generated the initial growth of
infection in Figure 1. This fall wave declined quickly due to very
strict interventions in early September, but the declining trend was
reversed following the October National Day holiday during
which population mobility increased and Fengxiao was suspended.
So, although the bimodality of an epidemic may in general be due
to a variety of factors such as varying rates of mobility, exogenous
seasonal process and/or endogenous changes in the population, it
is natural we chose to focus here on the impact of mobility and
NPIs on the pandemic infection.
To evaluate the effectiveness of NPIs considered here, we follow
a modeling approach for stratification of the population [5]
according to the clinical progression of disease and epidemiolog-
ical status of the individuals (Figure S1). We parameterize the
model using data obtained for the laboratory-confirmed cases of
H1N1 in the province of Shaanxi, and estimate the reproduction
number of disease transmission. In the context of a novel influenza
virus invading a naive population, estimates of the reproduction
number will determine the potential and severity of an outbreak,
and provide critical information for identifying the type of disease
interventions and the intensity of mitigation measures required for
achieving maximum protection of community health. We evaluate
various NPIs and extend the model to a meta-population
framework with network structures to address the impact of
Fengxiao and travel reduction on pandemic mitigation during and
following the Spring Festival holiday.
Results
Model-based estimates
We employed an adaptive Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) algo-
rithm to carry out extensive Markov-chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC)
simulations [6], and to estimate mean values of parameters
including quarantine rate, relative infectiousness of the pre-
symptomatic class, isolation rate, the reproduction number of
disease transmission and the initial data. Using large sample
realization, we fit the model to data of hospital notification for
H1N1 cases on the bases of exponential growth during the early
stages of the outbreak (see Materials and Methods and File S1
Appendix B). Given the model structure with quarantine and
Figure 1. The reported cases of H1N1 influenza for the province of Shaanxi. (A) Non-regularly daily number of hospital notifications for the
province of Shaanxi from September 3rd, 2009 to January 3rd, 2010; (B) Non-regularly daily reported community and sporadic cases from September
3rd to October 23rd 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.g001
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an expression for the control reproduction number when control
measures are in force as
Rc~
d1(1{w)
d1zqe ðÞ d2zqp

bd2
d3zc1
zeb

,
where b is the baseline transmission rate; w is the proportion of the
exposed individuals who performed effective precaution; qe and qp
model the rate of quarantining infected but not yet infectious and
infectious pre-symptomatic individuals respectively; e is the relative
transmissibility of pre-symptomatic infection; 1=d1 and 1=d2 are
respectively the durations of latency and infectiousness before the
onset of symptoms; 1=c1 is the duration of infectiousness following
symptoms onset; and 1=d3 is the period of time spent in
symptomatic stage before isolation (hospitalization). The epidemi-
ological interpretation of the above formula term-by-term is given
in File S1 Appendix A.
Based on recently available estimates of the epidemiological
characteristics such as the incubation and latent periods, and the
duration of treated (untreated) symptomatic infection (see Table
S1), and based on our model MF ignoring asymptomatic infection
(see File S1 Appendix A) we estimated the mean control
reproductive number (Rc) as 1.682 (95% CI 1.446–1.918, Figure
S2 (A)), the mean quarantine rate qe as 0.125 and qp as 0.387 for
the period from September 3rd to September 21st 2009. The
number of individuals who were exposed to the virus was also
estimated to be 5:553|105 with large variation, and the initial
values for other compartments were listed in Table 1.
To get rid of effect of estimating initial susceptible populations
on the estimates, we also used a simplified version of our baseline
model, model MR (see File S1 Appendix A), which is suitable to fit
the model with the initial exponential growth of the outbreak. This
yields the mean control reproductive number as 1.679 (95% CI
1.427–1.931, Figure S2 (B)), the mean estimated quarantine rate
qe and qp as 0.135 and 0.381, which agrees well with the above
estimated Rc using a more complicated model. We also plotted the
best-fit solution (Figure S3) and calculated R-square (R2) statistic
to show goodness of fit, where the R-square value is 0.960. Density
estimates of posterior densities of parameters and initial values
based on model MR were shown in Figure S4. To assess the effect
of asymptomatic infection on the control reproduction number Rc,
we repeated the above procedure but incorporating the asymp-
tomatic (infectious) compartment into the MR model (see MRA,
File S1 Appendix A). We obtained that the estimated control
reproduction number is 2.184 (95% CI 1.819–2.549, Figure S2
(C)). This shows that including asymptomatic cases into the
analysis leads to a greater control reproduction number with larger
variation.
Sensitivity analyses
To examine the effect of parameter changes (the ranges are
given in Table S1), especially durations of latency and
infectiousness before the onset of symptoms, and duration of
infectiousness following symptoms onset, on the control repro-
duction number, quarantine rates qe and qp, we carried out
sensitivity analyses (Figure 2), using MCMC method. It follows
that decreasing duration of latency results in a decline in Rc and
an increase in quarantine rate qe, and the quarantine rate qp is
not sensitive to variation of the latency (Figure 2 (A, D, G)).
Decreasing the duration of infectiousness before the onset of
symptoms results in a decline in Rc, a slight increase in
quarantine rates qp and qe (Figure 2 (B, E, H)). Decreasing the
duration of infectiousness following symptoms onset leads to a
decline in Rc, a decrease in quarantine rate qe, and little change
of the quarantine rate qp (Figure 2 (C, F, I)). The effect of varying
these parameters (1=d1,1=d2,1=c1 and 1=c2) on estimates of the
relative infectiousness of the pre-symptomatic class (e) and the
isolation rate (d3) is shown in Figure S5 and our analysis suggests
that parameters e and d3 are not sensitive to variation of those
four parameters.
The contour plots of Figure 3 (A,B) show the dependence of Rc
on average days from exposure to quarantine during latency 1=qe
(or during pre-symptomatic infection 1

qp) and average days from
onset of symptoms to isolation 1=d3. In both cases, the contour
plots show that the control strategies (increasing qe (or qp) and d3)
Table 1. Parameter estimates for the 2009 H1N1 influenza in the province of Shaanxi, China.
Parameter MF MR MRA
Mean Std Geweke Mean Std Geweke Mean Std Geweke
Rc 1.682 0.118 0.974 1.679 0.126 0.987 1.792 0.125 0.976
qe 0.125 0.108 0.878 0.135 0.122 0.875 0.061 0.075 0.827
qp 0.387 0.281 0.966 0.381 0.279 0.972 0.123 0.111 0.998
e 0.515 0.287 0.941 0.505 0.289 0.957 0.556 0.286 0.914
d3 1.094 0.433 0.923 1.079 0.435 0.997 1.164 0.444 0.873
r – – – – – – 0.802 0.187 0.893
% – – – – – – 0.433 0.273 0.808
S0 555310 261030 0.935 – – – – – –
E10 8 6 0.954 9 6 0.929 28 24 0.812
E20 4 3 0.916 4 3 0.983 17 20 0.784
I0 5 4 0.899 4 3 0.857 6 6 0.663
A0 – – – – – – 36 28 0.747
QE10 87 9 0.989 87 9 0.983 86 10 0.980
QE20 6 5 0.970 6 5 0.951 6 5 0.963
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.t001
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cases. With baseline parameter values (listed in Table S1 for model
MF), Figure 3 (A) shows that Rc decreases from 2.233 (or 2.333) to
0 as qe (or qp) increases from 0 to z?, and the outbreak can be
controlled when qe~0:47 (or qp~1:33) (corresponding to Rc~1).
The contour plots of Figure 3 (C) shows that the outbreak could be
controlled by either quarantining the exposed but not yet
infectious individuals or isolating the infectious during their pre-
symptomatic stages, as long as the measure was strict: the
quarantine rate qe (or qp) must be at the level of 0.801 or 2.1
for Rc to fall below the unity. It follows from Figure 3 (D) that for a
combination of quarantine and hygiene precaution measures,
increasing qp by 30% (while holding w at the current level) can
reduce Rc by 7:7%, and increasing w by 30% while holding the
current quarantine level can reduce Rc by 19:98%.
The Effectiveness of Fengxiao
To examine the effect of Fengxiao on controlling the spread
among university campuses and between the campus and
community, we formulate a metapopulation model, MG
F , using
the approach of [9] to couple the n~51 colleges and universities in
Xi’an, the capital city of Shaanxi [10] together. The disease
progression in each patch (campus) is tracked using the baseline
model, and the transmission among patches is represented by the
mobility of (untraced, unquarantined and unisolated) individuals
from one patch to another on a given dispersal network (see S1
Appendix C for details). Fengxiao obviously can not be sustained for
too long, and thus some decisions must be made for when this
should be initiated, when it should be suspended, and how it
should be integrated into other local control measures such as
quarantine and precaution measures. Once the daily number of
laboratory-confirmed cases in a given university Hj t ðÞreaches a
given threshold value Hmax, interventions involving Fengxiao or
enhanced local control measures (quarantine and hygiene
precaution) or a combination of both are implemented in the
university. When the daily number of laboratory-confirmed cases
in that university decreases to a low threshold value Hmin, these
interventions are suspended or weakened.
Figure 2. Sensitivity of the reproduction number and quarantine rate on model parameters. Sensitivityanalysesfortheeffect of durations
of latency and infectiousness before the onset of symptoms, and duration of infectiousness following symptoms onset on Rc (A, B, C); on the fraction of
exposed individuals who are quarantined during the latency (D, E, F) and pre-symptomatic infection (G, H, I), on the basis of model MR.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.g002
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delay the epidemic peak significantly and prevent the disease
spread to the general population, though it may cause more severe
outbreak due to the aggregate outbreaks within the universities/
college. Late implementation of Fengxiao has little effect on the
outbreak, with disease control outcomes similar to the case of no
implementation of Fengxiao. To examine the interaction of other
local control strategies and Fengxiao, we consider the scenario when
(a) strengthening quarantine and hygiene precaution measures are
taken without Fengxiao (Figure 4 (C–F) pink curves) or with Fengxiao
(Figure 4 (C–F) green or blue curves) if Hj t ðÞreaches Hmax; and
(b) Fengxiao is suspended and other local control strategies are
reduced to a low level when Hj t ðÞreduces the Hmin. Simulations
show, as indicated by Figure 4 (C–F), that magnitudes of the
outbreaks become weaker and weaker as Fengxiao and strengthen-
ing control measures are switched on and off, and the sooner the
local control measures are the less severe the outbreaks. Local
control strategies affect the peak magnitudes while Fengxiao
influences the peak timing. In general, comparing the green curve
in Figure 4 (A–B) (Fengxiao only) with the pink curve in Figure 4
(C–D and E–F) (local control measure only) implies that
strengthening local strategies is much more effective to mitigate
outbreaks than implementing Fengxiao. To illustrate the impact of
persistent local control strategies, we also simulate the scenario
that local control strategies are switched back to a relatively high
level when Hj t ðÞdecreases to the threshold Hmin (Figure 4 (G–H)),
and our simulations show that the relatively strong local control
measures implemented when Fengxiao is suspended can greatly
inhibit the successive wave.
Effect of increasing travel during the Spring Festival
To assess the impact of increasing nationwide travel or social
activities during the Spring Festival on the immediate future trend
of pandemic in mainland China, we use the aforementioned patch
model with 32 patches (mainland China has 23 provinces, 4
municipalities and 5 autonomous regions) and conduct some
simulations based on the parameter values for the province of
Shaanxi. We consider scenarios with increasing the population
mobility among the patches, weakening local control strategies or
increasing susceptible populations in the period of late January to
Figure 3. Contour plots of Rc. Plot contours of Rc versus the average days to isolation 1=d3 and average days from exposure to quarantine during
(A) latency (1=qe), (B) pre-symptomatic infection (1

qp); Plot contours of Rc versus mean period from exposure to quarantine during pre-symptomatic
infection 1

qp and (C) during latency 1=qe, (D) hygiene precaution rate w. All other parameter values are as shown in Table S1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.g003
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continue to recede if nothing happens, and Figure 5 (C–D) shows
that very strong spatial dispersal after day 260 (about February 1st)
slightly increases the pandemic infection in some patches but does
not change the downward trend overall. An immediate conse-
quence of the nationwide travel and increased social activities is
the increase of susceptible populations, and Figure 5 (E–F) shows
that doubling the susceptible population in each patch will
generate a quite spatially aggregated patterns of infections: a new
large wave in some patches but a quite small wave in others.
Weakening local control measures (quarantine or hygiene
precaution measures) by decreasing q or w yields similar outcomes
as increasing susceptible populations, except the new wave is much
more significant (Figure 5 (G–H)).
Further, we calculate the variation of the attract rate in the
period of late January to late June of 2010 due to weakening local
control measures during the Spring Festival (late January to late
February, 2010). Figure 6 (A) shows that weakening quarantine qe
and qp by 25% from qe~qp~0:4 while holding the current
hygiene precaution level (w~0:4) can increase the mean attack
rate by 349% (95% CI 278%–420%), and decreasing w by 25%
from w~0:4 while holding the current quarantine level
(qe~qp~0:4) can increase mean attack rate by 225% (95% CI
177%–273%). It also shows that reducing both quarantine rates qe
and qp and hygiene precaution level by w 25% from 0.4 can
increase mean attack rate by 1230% (95% CI 1064%–1396%). As
the quarantine (or precaution) level decreases, the effect of hygiene
precaution (or quarantine) becomes more pronounced in increas-
ing attack rate.
Massive travel without significant improvement of the trans-
portation system will likely increase the infection during the travel.
To see the impact of this infection during the travel on the global
outcome, we extended the full model MG
F to incorporate the
transport-related infection, see MG
FI of the S1 Appendix C. Figure 7
(A–B) shows the receding epidemic with relatively weak mobility
and low transport-related infection, while Figure 7 (C–D) shows
that with strong mobility only after day 260 (about February 1st of
2010) the infection in some patches increases and causes a small
new wave. Whilst high transport-related transmission rates with
weak mobility hardly influence the infection (Figure 7 (E–F)),
strong mobility coupled with high transport-related transmission
rates will result in a new wave in many patches and cause a large
new wave in most patches.
Similarly, we calculate the variation of the attract rate in the
period between the late January and late June of 2010 due to
massive travel and transport-related transmission during the
Spring Festival. Figure 6 (B) shows that increasing transport-
related transmission rate while holding dispersal at its current level
has little impact on the mean attack rate, which confirms the
results obtained in Figure 7 (E–F). It also shows that increasing
dispersal rate from 2{9 to 2{3 while holding the current transport-
related transmission (g~2:5) will increase mean attack rate by
552% (95% CI 398%–706%). Further, increasing both dispersal
rate from 2{9 to 2{3 and transport-related transmission rate g 1.5
times its current level can increase the mean attack rate by 1198%
(95% CI 944%–1452%). As the dispersal rate increases, the effect
of transport-related transmission becomes more pronounced in
increasing the mean attack rate.
Figure 4. Effects of local quarantine, hygiene precaution and Fengxiao on the A/H1N1 influenza outbreaks in the province of
Shaanxi. Numerical integrations of model MG
F are given in S1 Appendix D. 500 independent simulations are carried out. Mean sum of Ii t ðÞand
mean sum of Hi t ðÞare plotted by employing (A–B) case 1, magenta curve without Fengxiao, green curve with Hmax,Hmin 
~ 25,10 ðÞ and blue curve
with Hmax,Hmin 
~ 10,5 ðÞ ; (C–D) case 2a (3a), magenta (green) curve with Hmax,Hmin 
~ 25,10 ðÞ ; (E–F) case 2a (3a), magenta (blue) curve with
Hmax,Hmin 
~ 10,5 ðÞ ; (G–H) case 2b (3b), magenta (blue)curve with Hmax,Hmin 
~ 10,5 ðÞ . We fix the small world network structure as dispersal
pattern.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.g004
Mitigating H1N1 Pandemic
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 June 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 6 | e10911Figure 5. Effect of nationwide travel on A/H1N1 influenza outbreaks. We fix the small world network as dispersal pattern. Numerical
integrations of model MG
F given in Appendix D(case 4) are employed. Hi t ðÞ zIi t ðÞand summation of Hi t ðÞ zIi t ðÞfor all 32 patches in a single
simulation are plotted for the model MG
F (A–B) with weak dispersal; (C–D) with large dispersal after day 260; (E–F) with a doubled susceptible
population after day 260; (G–H) with a reduction of 20% local quarantine rates qe and qp.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.g005
Figure 6. Effect of local control measures and nationwide travel on mean attack rate. We fix the small world network as dispersal pattern.
200 independent simulations are carried out by employing Appendix D(case 4). Mean attack rates versus (A) quarantine rates and hygiene precaution
rate for the model MG
F ; (B) dispersal rate and transport-related transmission rate for the model MG
FI.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.g006
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Using initial data on the laboratory-confirmed cases of
pandemic H1N1 influenza in the province of Shaanxi, we
obtained estimates of the (control) reproduction number, NPIs
parameter values and the number of individuals who were exposed
to the virus. These estimates, along with information on
population susceptibility, provided information about the utility
or success of different community mitigation strategies. Our
estimated reproduction number from the hospital notifications
from September 3rd to September 21st is 1.682 (95% CI 1.446–
1.918). This number seems to be higher than those obtained in
published study of the data from Canada (1.25 to 1.38) [11] and
lower than those from New Zealand (1.96, 95% CI 1.80–2.15)
[12] during the Southern Hemisphere winter. Our estimate is
more consistent with those from Mexico (1.2 to 1.6) [13] and from
United States (1.7–1.8 after adjustment for increasing ascertain-
ment of cases) [14]. We believe our estimation reflects the
characteristics of the early epidemic in the province of Shaanxi,
since the initial infection was introduced by students returning to
universities at the beginning of the autumn term and secondary
infections were generated through close contact of small clusters
within the same dormitories or classes. Our estimation of the total
populations exposed to the virus added further confirmation for
this observation. Our estimation suggested that the population
exposed to the virus is much lower than the total population of the
province of Shaanxi, an indication of the effectiveness of NPIs such
as quarantine, hygiene precaution measures and early Fengxiao.
Note that our estimation of the reproduction number may
change slightly depending on the period chosen (see Appendix
Table S2), and estimations using simplified models ignoring
asymptotic infections yield similar estimates. Note that including
asymptomatic infection either increases or decreases the control
reproduction number Rc, depending on the sign of
%= c3zqa ðÞ {1= d3zc1 ðÞ (the relative infectiousness of the asymp-
tomatic infection versus infectiousness of the symptomatic
infection) [15]. Our estimates result in the reproduction number
with asymptomatic infection being greater than that in the absence
of asymptotic infections. Therefore, the estimates without
considering asymptomatic infection in our case may underestimate
the disease spread. We note that the study [16] shows that
assuming exponentially distributed latent and infectious periods
always results in underestimating the reproduction number of an
infection from outbreak data. As such, the control reproduction
number, based on our data and model assumption of exponen-
tially distributed latent and infectious periods, is underestimated.
Fengxiao as a public health policy in China, if implemented early,
has the advantage of delaying outbreak peaks and thus provides
the critically needed response time (e.g., vaccine production and
facility preparation) but it can not prevent the eventual outbreak.
Fengxiao, if not appropriately managed, may cause more severe
outbreak due to the aggregate outbreaks within the universities/
Figure 7. Effect of nationwide travel and infection during travel on A/H1N1 influenza outbreaks. We fix the small world network as
dispersal pattern. Numerical integrations of model MG
FI given in Appendix D(case 4) are employed. Hi t ðÞ zIi t ðÞand summation of Hi t ðÞ zIi t ðÞfor all
32 patches in a single simulation are plotted for the model MG
FI (A–B) with weak dispersal and low transmission during travel; (C–D) with large
dispersal after day 260; (E–F) with high transport-related transmission rate after day 260; (G–H) with both large dispersal and high transport-related
transmission after day 260.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.g007
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population. It is important to remark that Fengxiao in mainland
China is almost opposite to the school closure measure in other
countries [17,18]. Our findings are relevant to the conclusion by
Cauchemez et al. that school closure might lead to reduction in the
peak incidence of cases conditional upon children being
sufficiently isolated or policy being well implemented [18].
Our analyses suggest that Fengxiao alone is not enough to
mitigate pandemic infection but local control measures are
capable of significantly inhibiting the successive waves so long as
they remain in effect persistently. Comparison Figure 4 (E–F) and
(G–H) implies that the occurrence of the second wave is more
likely associated with the relaxation of interventions when Fengxiao
is suspended, a similar situation was observed in the 1918
influenza pandemic in U.S. [19]. This observation indicates the
potential risk of a new wave as people maybe less cautious of social
distancing during the upcoming Spring Festival, and this new
wave may require strong intervention strategies at its earlier stage
since it will likely coincide with the beginning of the new academic
term.
Massive transportation and social gathering during the Spring
Festival could lead to relaxing local control measures and
increasing the number of individuals exposed to the virus, both
will likely generate a sizable new wave in some provinces. So
there exists a strong correlation between massive travel and
H1N1 outbreak, as obtained by Khan et al. [20]. The additional
risk of transportation related infection and the massive home
coming of farmers to villages from major cities will make the
rural areas particularly vulnerable for the brunt of a renewed
outbreak. Therefore, disease prevention and control measures
must remain rigorous, as indicated by the Chinese Health
Ministry [21]. The simulation results (Figure 6) show that
increasing hygiene precautiono rq u a r a n t i n er a t eo rb o t hb y
33.3% from 0.4 can respectively reduce the attack rate by 69%
(95% CI 65%–74%), 78% (95% CI 74%–82%), and 93% (95%
CI 92%–94%), respectively. Reducing dispersal 50% from 2{4
or transport-related transmission 33.3% from 3.75 or both could
lead to a decline in attack rate by 56% (95% CI 44%–68%),
50% (95% CI 38%–62%) and 78% (95% CI 72%–84%),
respectively.
The implications of our simulation results should be interpreted
with care. Note that this study is a bit geographically specific, since
the data for the province of Shaanxi used here is more complete
and regular than those for the mainland China, but we hope the
approaches we used are able to be applied more generally. Our
findings suggest that early and comprehensive NPIs including
Fengxiao are credited for the small epidemics so far, but how
‘‘early’’ is quite an optimal issue. That is, the decision for the
trigger for Fengxiao and its suspension is crucial [22,23]. This work
was conducted before the Spring Festival and it would be natural
to compare our simulated scenarios with the real situation.
Unfortunately, as millions of Chinese complete one of the largest
human migration through a complicated national network of
transportation, reliable data about the dispersal rates and the
transport-related infection is not available. We, thus, pseudor-
andomly generated dispersal rates independently and identically
distributed among all patches for simulating the meta-population
model. Our simulation results indicate the importance of reducing
transportation related infection. But without reliable travel data
during the Spring Festival, our simulations remain more
qualitative. Despite these caveats, our simulation results strongly
suggest prompt implementation of multiple NPIs is required to
reduce a potential risk of new outbreak and to mitigate the new
outbreak should it occur.
Materials and Methods
Data
We obtained the data on laboratory-confirmed cases of
pandemic H1N1 influenza in the province of Shaanxi, China,
from the province’s Public Health Information System [2]. Data
information includes the cumulative number of reported, the
cumulative number of cured and the number of new cases
(identified within two days or a week). The data were released and
analyzed anonymously. There were 21 imported confirmed cases
before August 31st, which did not generate secondary cases and
hence were not included in our data set. On September 3rd, local
cases were found and reported in the Xi’an Institute of Art and
Science. Shaanxi Bureau of Health started to report cases daily
then changed, on September 19th and November 17th respec-
tively, to report once every two days and once every week. No data
is available on weekends (Figure 1 (A)). All confirmed cases in
mainland China were isolated in health care facilities with
treatments and were assumed to be unable to infect others.
Majority cases in the province of Shaanxi in early September were
associated with university/college campuses (Figure 1 (B))
(reflected by the number of community cases vs the number of
sporadic cases). After the National Day holiday season, there
seemed to be no significant difference between the community
cases and sporadic cases, and consequently after October 23 the
numbers of community and sporadic cases have no longer been
reported separately. According to a byelaw on pandemic A/H1N1
influenza, the Ministry of Health required that all medical
institutes should directly report within 2 hours through national
epidemic disease information system once they found cases which
comply with the definitions of probable, clinical and laboratory-
confirmed cases. So, we believe the data on laboratory-confirmed
cases of pandemic A/H1N1 influenza from September to
November were quite accurate [24]. Since December, however,
any patient with fever did not have to have a confirmation for A/
H1N1 virus for medical treatment, and hence H1N1 cases were
under-reported since then.
The model
We formulated a baseline model that reflects some key
epidemiological properties of the pandemic A/H1N1 influenza
and the implemented public health interventions (quarantine,
isolation and hygiene precaution). The underlying structure of the
model comprises of classes of individuals that are susceptible (S),
exposed but not yet infectious (E1), infectious but not yet
symptomatic (pre-symptomatic) (E2) [22], infectious with symp-
toms (I), and recovered (R). We considered quarantine of
individuals that have been exposed to indexed cases (QE1 and
QE2), and further isolation and hospitalization of those who
develop symptomatic infection during the period of quarantine
(H). Our model also incorporates precautionary measures: when
effective precautionary measures are taken, a proportion, w, of the
individuals exposed to the virus is protected from the infection. It is
also assumed that those who were quarantined and/or isolated/
hospitalized did not contribute to the spread. See Figure S1 for a
schematic illustration of the baseline model, and Appendix Table
S1 for parameter definitions. The model equations are given in S1
Appendix A. In order to investigate the effect of Fengxiao and
travel reduction on pandemic mitigation, we extended the baseline
model to a meta-population model with network structures.
Dispersal rates are the same order as the total number of
individuals in a patch on the basis of model formulation, resulting
in the possibility where some patches may have small population
sizes, and hence demographic stochasticity may become important
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below, however, did not yield any patch with small population size
in both the reality and our simulations. Therefore, we formulate
our meta-population model deterministically. Recent studies such
as [25] suggested that people born before 1950 might have
residual immunity against the influenza A/H1N1 subtype (both
seasonal and pandemic), it would be desirable to consider the
impact of age structure. Our data on laboratory-confirmed cases
from the province’s public health information system [2], however,
do not include information on age distribution. Consequently, we
formulated the compartment model without incorporating age
structure. Note that the susceptible population in our model is not
the total population of the province, but rather the population
(effectively) exposed to the virus. This population size is estimated
from our model simulations.
Simulations
Due to the non-regularly daily reported data from province of
Shaanxi such as reporting delays on weekends and reporting
policy changed, the daily hospital cases were generated by using
the cubic spline interpolation method, implemented as a Matlab
program. We used an adaptive Metropolis-Hastings (M-H)
algorithm to carry out the MCMC procedure (see S1 Appendix
B), and after a burn-in period of 500000 iterations the next
1000000 samplers gives estimates [6]. We estimated mean values
including Rc and other parameters and their stand deviations
based on the exponential growth phase of hospital notifications
between September 3rd and September 21st, the duration of
exponential growth in the early stage of the outbreak. Our
estimates of the reproduction number includes the effect of
hospitalization of infectious cases as reported in data, and we
therefore considered a parameter for isolation of diagnosed
infectious cases.
To implement Fengxiao based on the meta-population model [9],
we generated the dispersal rates among all patches independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) on the interval 0,2{h 
, say, let
h~14 represent the Fengxiao, and h~9,4 describe weak and strong
dispersal, respectively. Define the upper and low threshold of the
hospital notifications and switch on and off the Fengxiao measures
together with or without strengthening local interventions in any
university/college in terms of hospital notifications (S1 Appendix
D). That is, the dispersal rates or local quarantine and precaution
rates are updated when the hospital notifications in any
community reaches the upper or low threshold. In simulating
impact of nationwide travel on A/H1N1 flu outbreak in mainland
China we changed dispersal rates and interventions in the fixed
period of Spring Festival holiday on the basis of models MG
F and
MG
FI.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Flow diagram for the pandemic H1N1 spread in
mainland China, that incorporates disease progression and key
intervention measures.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.s001 (0.01 MB EPS)
Figure S2 Estimates of the control reproduction number Rc in
the province of Shaanxi during the wave of pandemic A/H1N1
influenza in the autumn of 2009. Estimates were generated with
the use of MCMC and on the basis of (A) model MF, the mean
Rc=1.682; (B) the reduced model MR, the mean c=1.679; (C) the
reduced model with asymptomatic infection MRA, the mean
Rc=1.792.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.s002 (0.02 MB EPS)
Figure S3 The best-fit solution obtained by fitting H(t) in model
MR to the hospital notifications from September 3rd to 21st, 2009.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.s003 (0.01 MB EPS)
Figure S4 Density estimates of posterior densities of five
parameters and five initial values on the basis of model MR.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.s004 (0.02 MB EPS)
Figure S5 Sensitivity of relative infectiousness of the pre-
symptomatic class (e) and isolation rate (d3) on model parameters.
Sensitivity analyses for the effect of durations of latency and
infectiousness before the onset of symptoms, and duration of
infectiousness following symptoms onset on epsilon (A, B, C); on
isolation rate (D, E, F), on the basis of model MR.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.s005 (0.02 MB EPS)
Table S1 Parameter definitions and values for the baseline
model S1. Values for r, varrho and qa are estimated by the model
MRA. The mean value for b is calculated from the formula of Rc
and the given Q. We choose qeM[0, 0.6], qp [0, 0.6] and QM [0, 0.6]
in our numerical simulations to represent variation of control
strategies.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.s006 (0.03 MB
PDF)
Table S2 Sensitivity analysis of mean Rc on the periods for
model MF.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.s007 (0.02 MB
PDF)
File S1
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.s008 (0.13 MB
PDF)
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